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HUTTON v. STATE: WHOSE RIGHTS ARE PARAMOUNT,
THE DEFENDANT'S OR THE CHILD VICTIM'S?
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past twenty years, there has been a tremendous increase
in the number of reported cases of child sexual abuse in the United
States.' Documented cases increased from 6,000 in 1976 to 432,000
in 1991, representing more than a 2300% growth rate. 2 Some com-
mentators estimate that between twenty and forty percent of sexu-
ally abused children display signs of psychological disturbance im-
mediately after sexual abuse. 3 Criminal prosecution of these cases is
difficult because there are usually no eyewitnesses, and the child
complainant is often unwilling or unable to testify.4 Additionally, the
1. See Arthur J. Lurigio et al., Child Sexual Abuse: Its Causes, Consequences, and Im-
plications for Probation Practice, 59 FED. PROBATION 69, 69 (1995). "Child sexual
abuse" is defined as coerced, tricked, or forced sexual activity between an
adult and a person sixteen years old or younger. See David McCord, Expert Psy-
chological Testimony About Child Complainants in Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A Foray
Into the Admissibility of Novel Psychological Evidence, 77 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1, 8-9 (1986).
2. See Lurigio et al., supra note 1, at 69. The huge increase and resulting impact
on the legal system has been attributed to intense media coverage of the sub-
ject during the early 1980s. See Lisa R. Askowitz, Restricting the Admissibility of
Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecution: Pennsylvania Takes It to the Ex-
treme, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 201, 202 (1992) (citing DAVID F'I-LHOR, CHILD SEX-
UAL ABUSE: NEW THEORY AND RESEARCH 1, 3 (1984)). The women's movement
brought the problem to public attention during the late 1970s. See id.
3. See Lurigio et al., supra note 1, at 70 (citing Angela Browne & David
Finkelhor, Impact of Child Sexual Abuse: A Review of the Literature, 99 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 66, 66-77 (1986)).
4. See John E.B. Myers et al., Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 68
NEB. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1989); see also Veronica Serrato, Expert Testimony in Child
Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A Spectrum of Uses, 68 B.U. L. REV. 155, 158 (1988). Ev-
identiary problems arise due to the fear and reluctance a child often feels
when testifying against a trusted adult, especially a family member. See Serrato,
supra, at 159-60. Even when children testify, their limited cognitive and linguis-
tic abilities present problems in describing abuse. See id. at 159. Any child wit-
ness, abused or not, may become confused by dates, times, and frequencies of
events, especially when a cross-examiner fails to phrase questions in an age-
appropriate fashion. See id. at 161. Jurors may interpret such inconsistencies or
confusion on the child's part as indicating that the child's testimony is unreli-
able. See id.
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prosecution often lacks physical evidence in child sexual abuse
cases.
5
To combat these evidentiary problems, prosecutors have in-
creasingly used expert testimony regarding psychological syndromes
such as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) as evidence of child
sexual abuse.6 PTSD is an emotional disorder in which a person suf-
fers various symptoms 7 after experiencing a traumatic event.8 Where
the "triggering stressor" of PTSD is rape, the disorder is commonly
labeled Rape Trauma Syndrome (RTS);9 where the PTSD victim is a
5. Only 10% to 50% of child sexual abuse cases involve physical or medical evi-
dence. See Myers et al., supra note 4, at 34 n.120.
6. See Bruce Gardner, Prosecutors Should Think Twice Before Using Experts in Child
Sex Abuse Cases, 3 CRIM. JusT. 12, 13 (1988).
7. The four categories of PTSD symptoms are as follows:
A. Existence of a recognizable stressor that would evoke signifi-
cant symptoms of distress in almost everyone.
B. Re-experiencing of the trauma as evidenced by at least one of
the following: (1) recurrent and intrusive recollections of the event;
(2) recurrent dreams of the event; (3) sudden acting or feeling as if
the traumatic event were reoccurring, because of an association with
an environmental or ideational stimulus.
C. Numbing of responsiveness to or reduced involvement with
the external world, beginning sometime after the trauma, as shown
by at least one of the following: (1) markedly diminished interest in
one or more significant activities; (2) feeling of detachment or es-
trangement from others; (3) constricted affect.
D. At least two of the following symptoms that were not present
before the trauma: (1) hyperalertness or exaggerated startle re-
sponse; (2) sleep disturbance; (3) guilt about surviving when others
have not, or about behavior required for survival; (4) memory im-
pairment or trouble concentrating; (5) avoidance of activities that
arouse recollection of the traumatic event; (6) intensification of
symptoms by exposure to events that symbolize or resemble the trau-
matic event.
State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 100 & n.6, 517 A.2d 741, 747 & n.6 (1986) (citing
AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N., DIAGNOSTIC AND STAT. MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
(3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter DSM-II]).
8. See Allewalt, 308 Md. at 100, 517 A.2d at 746. Stressful incidents that can cause
PTSD symptoms include automobile or airplane accidents, natural disasters,
wartime combat, and rape. See Hutton v. State, 339 Md. 480, 491, 663 A.2d
1289, 1294 (1995) (citing Joseph T. Smith, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder: An
Often Overlooked Element of Trauma, 20 TRIAL 92 (1984)). PTSD was first recog-
nized as a syndrome by psychologists treating Vietnam War veterans. See Ken-
neth M. Gordon, Rape Trauma Syndrome in Sexual Assault Cases, 20 COLO. LAw
2509 (1991).
9. See Gordon supra note 8. The same group of psychologists who originally rec-
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child, the disorder is commonly labeled Child Sexual Abuse Accom-
modation Syndrome (CSAAS). l0 In both instances, state courts
across the country are sharply divided on the proper use of PTSD
testimony in sexual abuse cases.1
The Court of Appeals of Maryland most recently addressed the
admissability of PTSD evidence in Hutton v. State.12 The Hutton case
involved a charge that a father sexually abused his stepdaughter.'
3
At trial, the Circuit Court for Prince George's County admitted ex-
pert testimony that the victim suffered from PTSD, including the
expert's statement that the child's disorder "was not in any way
faked."14 On appeal, the court of appeals held that PTSD expert tes-
timony is inadmissible as proof of sexual abuse, reasoning that ex-
pert information on this psychiatric disorder is often unreliable and
can usurp the jury's role of assessing witness credibility. 5 This Note
examines the Hutton court's treatment of three major issues: (1) the
scientific and legal reliability of a PTSD diagnosis as evidence; (2)
the proper use of PTSD evidence in criminal trials; and (3) whether
PTSD evidence should be used differently when the sexual abuse
victim is a child.'
6
ognized PTSD as a syndrome specifically designated RTS as a subcategory of
PTSD. See id. "For a period of seventeen years, the scientific community has
recognized RTS as a clinical description that distinguishes rape victims from
other groups of victims." Cynthia F. Feagan, Note, Rape Trauma Syndrome Testi-
mony as Scientific Evidence: Evolving Beyond State v. Taylor, 61 UMKC L. REv. 145,
152 (1992) (citing Karla Fischer, Note, Defining the Boundaries of Admissible Ex-
pert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 691, 707-08
(1989)); see also Ann Burgess & Linda Holmstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome, 131
Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 981 (1974) (discussing RTS).
10. Sexually abused children may exhibit additional behaviors and characteristics
of PTSD symptoms, including as follows: "(1) secrecy, (2) helplessness, (3) en-
trapment and accommodation, (4) delayed, conflicted, and unconvincing dis-
closure, and (5) retraction." Roland C. Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse Accom-
modation Syndrome, 7 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECr 177, 181 (1983). Courts generally
appear to view expert diagnoses of RTS, CSAAS, and PTSD as synonymous
when the triggering event is sexual abuse. See, e.g., State v. Ballard, 855 S.W.2d
557, 561 (Tenn. 1993); see also supra notes 7-8 (discussing PTSD symptoms and
causes).
11. See infra notes 34-75 and accompanying text.
12. 339 Md. 480, 663 A.2d 1289 (1995).
13. See infra notes 109-15 and accompanying text.
14. Hutton, 339 Md. at 484, 663 A.2d at 1290.
15. See infra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.




A. Admissability of Expert Testimony Under Maryland Law
For evidence to be admissible, it must be relevant under the
circumstances of the case. 7 Expert testimony is relevant if it pro-
vides "appreciable help [to the factfinder] in resolving the issues
presented in the case." 8 The trial court may exclude relevant evi-
dence, however, where the danger of unfair prejudice or jury confu-
sion substantially outweighs its probative value.' 9
Only a qualified witness may offer expert opinion testimony.20
The court considers the factual basis for the expert's opinion in or-
der to determine competency 21 and probative value. 22 An opinion
17. See, e.g., State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 101, 517 A.2d 741, 747 (1986). The Al-
lewalt court stated it is "an elementary rule that evidence, to be admissible,
must be relevant to the issues and must tend either to establish or disprove
them." Id. (quoting Kennedy v. Crouch, 191 Md. 580, 585, 62 A.2d 582, 585
(1948)). The Maryland Rules of Evidence define relevant evidence as "evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence." MD. RULE 5-401. The trial court has broad
discretion to decide relevance. See Allewalt, 308 Md. at 101, 517 A.2d at 747; see
also Simmons v. State, 313 Md. 33, 43, 542 A.2d 1258, 1263 (1988).
18. Simmons, 313 Md. at 41, 542 A.2d at 1262. "The critical determination is
whether the jury will be aided by the opinion, not whether the jury could draw the
inference or conclusion from the testimony independent of the opinion." Id.
at 43, 542 A.2d at 1263 (citation omitted). A trial court's admission of expert
testimony where the jury could draw conclusions without the opinion, how-
ever, could be a factor in a reviewing court's determination of whether the
trial court abused its discretion in admitting the expert testimony. See id.; see
also MD. RuLE 5-702.
19. See MD. RuLE 5-403; see also Allewalt, 308 Md. at 102, 517 A.2d at 747-48. The Al-
lewalt court defined "unfairly prejudicial evidence" as that which has "some
adverse effect upon a defendant beyond tending to prove the fact or issue
that justified its admission into evidence," such as unfairly creating a negative
jury perception of the defendant. Id. (quoting United States v. Figueroa, 618
F.2d 934, 943 (2d Cir. 1980)).
20. The trial judge qualifies a witness as an expert based on a finding that the ed-
ucation and experience of the witness enables him to render an opinion. See
Simmons, 313 Md. at 41, 542 A.2d at 1262 (citing Crews v. Director, 245 Md.
174, 225 A.2d 436 (1967), and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Messenger, 181 Md. 295, 29
A.2d 653 (1943)); see also MD. RuLE 5-702.
21. Competent expert testimony is that which is based on a "legally sufficient fac-
tual foundation." Simmons, 313 Md. at 41-42, 542 A.2d at 1262 (citing State
Health Dep't. v. Walker, 238 Md. 512, 520, 209 A.2d 555, 559-60 (1965)); see
also MD. RuLE 5-702.
22. See, e.g., Bohnert v. State, 312 Md. 266, 274, 539 A.2d 657, 661 (1988) (citing
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need not be based solely on admissible facts in order for a jury to
consider it. 3 The fact that relevant, qualified, competent expert tes-
timony includes an opinion regarding an "ultimate issue" to be de-
cided by the jury is also not a bar to its admissibility.2 4
Where expert opinion testimony includes results of scientific
testing, such evidence must meet the Frye standard of admissibility.
25
Under this standard, scientific evidence must have "gained general
acceptance in the [relevant] scientific community" to be considered
for admissibility in court.26 Consequently, if a Maryland court views
PTSD to be scientific, psychological evidence, then the evidence
must pass the Frye test to be admitted.
27
B. Reliability of PTSD-Disagreement Among Jurisdictions
Since the early 1980s, the admissibility of expert testimony re-
garding PTSD has become an issue in sexual abuse cases across the
Doyle v. Rody, 180 Md. 471, 25 A.2d 457 (1942)); see also MD. RuLE 5-703.
23. The Maryland Rules of Evidence provide:
(a) The facts or data in the particular case upon which an ex-
pert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or
made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type rea-
sonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not
be admissible in evidence.
MD. RULE 5-703 (A). MD. RuLE 5-703 (b) requires the trial court, upon request,
to instruct the jury to use an otherwise inadmissible basis for an expert's opin-
ion "only for the purpose of evaluating the validity and probative value of the
expert's opinion or inference." Id; see also MD. RULE 5-705 (allowing an expert
to render an opinion on direct examination "without first testifying to the un-
derlying facts or data").
24. See Simmons, 313 Md. at 42, 542 A.2d at 1262. The ultimate test of admissibility
is whether an expert's opinion is "rationally based and would be helpful to
the factfinder." Id. at 43, 542 A.2d at 1262-63 (quoting LYNN McLAIN, MARY-
LAND PRACTICE § 704.1, at 246 (1987)); see also MD. RuLE 5-704.
25. The "Frye standard" for reliability and admissibility of scientific evidence was
first enunciated in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See
also infra note 26.
26. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 389, 391 A.2d 364, 372 (1978) (adopting the Frye
standard in Maryland). Almost all states employ this standard. See id. at 382,
391 A.2d at 368. The Supreme Court replaced the Frye standard in the federal
court system with a less stringent test in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). See State v. Schultz, 106 Md. App. 145, 153 n.3, 664
A.2d 60, 64 n.3 (1995). Maryland has retained the Frye standard, however, not-
withstanding that the Maryland Rules of Evidence are modeled after the pre-
Daubert federal rules.
27. See State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 99, 517 A.2d 741, 746 (1986).
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country.2 A threshold question concerning the admissibility of
PTSD testimony is whether such evidence is sufficiently reliable for
use in court.29 Generally, the legal reliability of PTSD has two re-
lated aspects: (1) whether the syndrome is generally accepted as a
psychological disorder in the relevant scientific community (Frye
standard);30 and (2) whether PTSD evidence is reliable within the
context of the purpose for which it is offered.3' If a trial judge finds
an expert is qualified and that PTSD evidence is relevant and relia-
ble, then the judge may admit the evidence. 32 If admitted, the jury
decides how much weight to give the expert's testimony.
33
In State v. Saldana,34 an early case addressing the admissibility of
PTSD evidence, the Supreme Court of Minnesota ruled that expert
testimony on RTS was inadmissible to prove the occurrence of a
rape. 35 The defendant conceded having sexual intercourse with the
victim, but claimed she consented to the act.36 The supreme court
held inadmissible a sexual assault counselor's expert opinion that
the victim's behavior and symptoms indicated she was telling the
truth about being raped.
37
The Saldana court based its holding on its belief that an expert
is in no better position than a jury to assess a witness's credibility.
38
The court stated that a diagnosis of RTS is a therapeutic counseling
tool, not a factfinding tool.39 The court found that there was a dan-
ger that a jury might place undue weight on an "expert" opinion
28. See infra notes 34-75.
29. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830, 831-34 (Pa. 1992) ("[N]o evi-
dence indicates that it can discriminate between sexually abused children and
those who have experienced other trauma." (quoting JEFFREY J. HAUGAARD &
N. DICKON REPPuccI, THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN, A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE
TO CURRENT KNOWLEDGE AND INTERVENTION STRATEGIES 177-78 (1988)).
30. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. In Maryland, the "general ac-
ceptance test" is commonly referred to as "Frye-Reed' or "Reed-Frye" standard.
See, e.g., JOSEPH F. MURPHY, MARYLAND EVIDENCE HANDBOOK § 1406(A), at 726-30
(2d ed. 1993).
31. See People v. Bledsoe, 681 P.2d 291, 298 (Cal. 1984) ("[A]dmissibility of expert
testimony on a given subject must turn both on the nature of the particular
evidence and its relation to a question actually at issue in the case.").
32. See Simmons v. State, 313 Md. 33, 42-43, 542 A.2d 1258, 1262-63 (1988).
33. See State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 103, 517 A.2d 741, 748 (1986).
34. 324 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 1982).
35. See id. at 229.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 229-30.
39. See id. at 230.
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regarding a victim's version of events which could unfairly prejudice
a defendant.40
Subsequently, in State v. Myers,41 the Supreme Court of Minne-
sota held admissible rebuttal expert testimony relating common
characteristics of sexually abused children to the victim. 42 The
defendant in Myers was convicted of sexually molesting the seven-
year-old daughter of his girlfriend.43 The court upheld the trial
judge's admission of a clinical psychologist's expert testimony that
compared general behaviors of sexually abused children 44 with spe-
cific traits the expert observed in the victim.45
In ruling that expert testimony on a witness's reliability should
be admitted when the victim is a child,46 the court stated that traits
of sexually abused children are beyond most jurors' life experiences
and understanding, especially where incest is involved. 47 The court
also held that the expert's opinion concerning the child's truthful-
ness was admissible to rebut a defense attack on the child's credibil-
ity.48 Notably, the testimony at issue in Myers did not include a diag-
nosis or discussion of PTSD as a syndrome.
49
In State v. Bachman,50 which also involved sexual molestation of
children by their mother's boyfriend, the Supreme Court of South
Dakota held admissible expert opinions relating characteristics of
40. See id.
41. 359 N.W.2d 604 (Minn. 1984).
42. See id. at 609.
43. See id. at 606.
44. The expert testified that a young girl may be reluctant to disclose sexual
abuse because of fear of punishment or family disintegration, confusion re-
garding the appropriateness of the abusing adult's conduct, and mistrust of
the mother. See id. at 608-09.
45. See id. Specific indicators of sexual abuse discussed by the expert included cer-
tain types of nightmares, age-inappropriate understanding of sexual matters,
and displaying a fear of men. See id. at 609.
46. See id. at 610 n.4 (citing United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 913 (9th Cir.
1973)).
47. See id. at 610. The expert defined the term "incest" as child sexual abuse by
any person in a caregiver or parental relationship with a child. See id. at 608
n.2.
48. See id. at 611-12. Cross-examination by the defense of the victim's mother was
intended to show that the mother disbelieved the child's claim of sexual
abuse. See id. The court affirmed the trial judge's ruling that the defendant
had thus "opened the door" to the expert testimony regarding the child's
credibility. Id.
49. See id.
50. 446 N.W.2d 271 (S.D. 1989).
1997]
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RTS to nine and ten-year-old victims.5' The court also upheld the
trial court's admission of expert testimony that the children were
truthful regarding the abuseK2-the jury had been instructed "that it
was to be the sole judge of the credibility of the child witnesses and
that it was not bound to accept" the expert testimony.53 The Bach-
man court further held that RTS passes the Frye test when offered
51. See id. at 274-77; see also Hill v. State, 507 So. 2d 554, 555 (Ala. Crim. App.
1986) (admitting expert testimony regarding "battered spouse syndrome");
Rodriguez v. State, 741 P.2d 1200, 1205 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987) (admitting ex-
pert testimony regarding characteristics of child sexual abuse); State v. Moran,
728 P.2d 248, 255 (Ariz. 1986) (admitting expert testimony regarding behav-
iors of sexual abuse victims, but not to demonstrate victim's credibility); Peo-
ple v. Jeff, 251 Cal. Rptr. 135, 153 (Ct. App. 1988) (admitting expert testimony
on "child molestation syndrome"); Ward v. State, 519 So. 2d 1082, 1083 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (admitting expert testimony of symptoms indicative of
child molestation); State v. Reser, 767 P.2d 1277, 1283 (Kan. 1989) (admitting
psychologist's testimony on behavior patterns of sexual abuse victims); State v.
Black, 537 A.2d 1154, 1156 (Me. 1988) (admitting expert testimony to rebut al-
legations that accuser's actions are inconsistent with victim behavior); State v.
Beckley, 456 N.W.2d 391, 710 (Mich. 1990) (admitting expert opinion of be-
havior patterns of sexual abuse victims to rebut allegations that victims behav-
ior was inconsistent with characteristics associated with sexual abuse); In re Ni-
cole V., 518 N.E.2d 914, 918 (N.Y 1987) (allowing expert opinion testimony
that child's behavior was symptomatic of sexual abuse); State v. Middleton, 657
P.2d 1215, 1216 (Or. 1983) (admitting expert testimony that child's behavior
was typical of rape victims); McCafferty v. Solem, 449 N.W.2d 590, 539 (S.D.
1989) (admitting expert's opinion that child's testimony of sexual abuse was
typical); State v. Kallin, 877 P.2d 138, 141 (Utah 1994) (admitting expert testi-
mony that child's behavior was consistent with symptoms of sexual abuse, but
not to substantiate child's statement); State v. Gokey, 574 A.2d 766, 768 (Vt.
1990) (holding admissible expert testimony on conclusion of whether witness
was victim of sexual assault); State v. Edward Charles L., 398 S.E.2d 123 (W.
Va. 1990) (holding expert testimony admissible to show child behavior com-
ports with victim profile); Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973, 979 (Wyo. 1988)
(holding expert testimony regarding victim behavior admissible to assist jury
in understanding accuser's behavior). But see Russell v. State, 712 S.W.2d 916,
917 (Ark. 1986) (holding that trial court erred in admitting expert testimony
regarding consistency of child's testimony); State v. Hudnall, 359 S.E.2d 59, 62
(S.C. 1987) (holding inadmissable expert testimony used to bolster child's tes-
timony); Ochs v. Martinez, 789 S.W.2d 949, 958 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (ex-
cluding expert testimony relating to credibility of child's statements); State v.
Catsam, 534 A.2d 184, 187 (Vt. 1987) (admitting expert testimony of PTSD
syndrome, but not regarding credibility of PTSD sufferers); State v. Jensen,
415 N.W.2d 519, 522 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (holding inadmissable expert's opin-
ion that witness had been sexually assaulted).
52. See Bachman, 446 N.W.2d at 276.
53. Id. at 275.
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for the purpose of explaining characteristics of sexually abused chil-
dren in a criminal trial.54 The court noted that the experts did not
testify that they believed the particular defendant perpetrated the
abuse.5 5 In this context, the court found that RTS testimony passed
the Frye test.1
6
In attempting to balance the probative value of PTSD testimony
against its prejudicial effect,57 several other jurisdictions also allow
limited use of this testimony. For example, some courts will admit
PTSD expert opinion evidence to rebut a defense claim of con-
sent.5 8 Other courts will admit PTSD testimony to explain inconsis-
tencies in a child's behavior following an alleged rape, such as
delayed reporting or recantation.59 A few courts will also allow an
expert to opine that sexual abuse caused a child's PTSD.60 However,
54. See id. at 277.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. All evidence is prejudicial toward the party against whom it is offered; the
court's duty in this area is to avoid substantially unfair prejudice. See, e.g., State
v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 102, 517 A.2d 741, 747-48 (1986); see also supra note 19
and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., State v. Huey, 699 P.2d 1290, 1294 (Ariz. 1985); State v. Marks, 647
P.2d 1292, 1299 (Kan. 1982) (holding that because a RTS diagnosis meets the
Frye standard for a psychiatric test, RTS evidence is admissible and properly
leaves a jury to weigh the expert's testimony in deciding consent issue); State
v. Liddell, 685 P.2d 918, 923 (Mont. 1984). But see State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d
235, 241-42 (Mo. 1984) (holding PTSD testimony as unfairly prejudicial, not
probative of triggering traumatic event, and inadmissible to prove lack of con-
sent).
59. See Ex parte Hill, 553 So. 2d 1138, 1139 (Ala. 1989); Nelson v. State, 782 P.2d
290, 298 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989); State v. Lindsey, 720 P.2d 73, 75 (Ariz. 1986);
People v. Bledsoe, 681 P.2d 291, 297-98 (Cal. 1984); People v. Hampton, 746
P.2d 947, 952 (Colo. 1987); State v. Spigarolo, 556 A.2d 112, 123 (Conn. 1989);
Wheat v. State, 527 A.2d 269, 272 (Del. 1987); Kruse v. State, 483 So. 2d 1383,
1385 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Hicks v. State, 396 S.E.2d 60, 62 (Ga. Ct. App.
1990); People v. Wasson, 569 N.E.2d 1321, 1327 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Simmons
v. State, 504 N.E.2d 575, 578 (Ind. 1987); State v. Black, 537 A.2d 1154, 1156
(Me. 1988) (admissible on rebuttal only); Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 626
N.E.2d 892, 895 (Mass. 1994); People v. Matlock, 395 N.W.2d 274, 277 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1986); State v. Sandberg, 406 N.W.2d 506, 511 (Minn. 1987); Hosford
v. State, 560 So. 2d 163, 166 (Miss. 1990); State v. Doan, 498 N.W.2d 804, 809
(Neb. 1993); Smith v. State, 688 P.2d 326, 327 (Nev. 1984); State v. Lucero, 863
P.2d 1071, 1076 (N.M. 1993); People v. Taylor, 552 N.E.2d 131, 136 (N.Y 1990);
State v. Bailey, 365 S.E.2d 651, 655 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Rogers, 362
S.E.2d 7, 8 (S.C. 1987); Frenzel v. State, 849 P.2d 741, 748 (Wyo. 1993).
60. See Broderick v. King's Way Assembly of God Church, 808 P.2d 1211, 1217
(Alaska 1991); In re Cheryl H., 200 Cal. Rptr. 789, 800 (Ct. App. 1984); Hicks v.
1997] 299
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courts almost unanimously exclude an expert witness's opinion that
vouches for the credibility of the victim.
61
Some courts have stated that PTSD evidence meets the Frye
standard to establish the occurrence of a traumatic event, but is un-
reliable to prove the nature of the event.62 In holding PTSD testi-
mony inadmissible to prove rape, these courts have found that the
probative value of such evidence is outweighed by the danger that a
defendant would be unfairly prejudiced by its admission.
63
State, 396 S.E.2d 60, 62 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Hester, 760 P.2d 27, 31
(Idaho 1988); People v. Wasson, 569 N.E.2d 1321, 1327 (Ill. Ct. App. 1991);
State v. Ogle, 668 S.W.2d 138, 141 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Townsend v. State, 734
P.2d 705, 708 (Nev. 1987); State v. Timperio, 528 N.E.2d 594, 596 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1987); State v. Edward Charles L., 398 S.E.2d 123, 141 (W. Va. 1990); cf
Taylor v. Commonwealth, 466 S.E.2d 118, 122 (Va. Ct. App. 1996) (holding
PTSD expert testimony admissible when limited to opinion that trauma
caused disorder without naming type of trauma).
61. See Kruse v. State, 483 So. 2d 1383, 1387-88 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); see also
State v. Lindsey, 720 P.2d 73, 75 (Ariz. 1986); In re Noel M., 580 A.2d 996, 1002
(Conn. App. Ct. 1990); Powell v. State, 527 A.2d 276, 278 (Del. 1987); Tingle v.
State, 536 So. 2d 202, 205 (Fla. 1988); Smith v. State, 377 S.E.2d 158, 160 (Ga.
1989); State v. Myers, 382 N.W.2d 91, 97 (Iowa 1986); State v. Jackson, 721 P.2d
232, 237 (Kan. 1986); Hester v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 457, 458 (Ky.
1987); Commonwealth v. lanello, 515 N.E.2d 1181, 1184 (Mass. 1987); People
v. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d 391, 399 (Mich. 1990); State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235,
241 (Mo. 1984); Townsend v. State, 734 P.2d 705, 708 (Nev. 1987); State v. Bai-
ley, 365 S.E.2d 651, 655 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Boston, 545 N.E.2d 1220,
1240 (Ohio 1989); Lawrence v. State, 796 P.2d 1176, 1177 (Okla. Crim. App.
1990); State v. Milbradt, 756 P.2d 620, 624 (Or. 1988); Commonwealth v. Seese,
517 A.2d 920, 922 (Pa. 1986); Ochs v. Martinez, 789 S.W.2d 949, 956 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1990); State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 393 (Utah 1989); State v.
Catsam, 534 A.2d 184, 188 (Vt. 1987); State v. Madison, 770 P.2d 662, 666
(Wash. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Edward Charles L., 398 S.E.2d 123, 139 (W. Va.
1990); Zabel v. State, 765 P.2d 357, 360 (Wyo. 1988). But see State v. Busch, 515
So. 2d 605, 608 (La. Ct. App. 1987); State v. French, 760 P.2d 86, 89 (Mont.
1988); State v. Bachman, 446 N.W.2d 271, 276 (S.D. 1989) (avoiding reversal
on credibility grounds by disallowing expert opinion that child complainant
was abused).
62. See Frenzel v. State, 849 P.2d 741, 749 (Wyo. 1993); see also Spencer v. General
Elec. Co., 688 F. Supp. 1072, 1076 (E.D. Va. 1988); State v. Saldana, 324
N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 1982). See generally State v. Cressey, 628 A.2d 696, 699-
701 (N.H. 1993) (determining PTSD fails Frye test because there is no stan-
dardized method for diagnosing the syndrome).
63. See, e.g., Frenzel, 849 P.2d. at 748 (stating CSAAS testimony "can be very preju-
dicial due to its unreliability"); Spencer, 688 F. Supp. at 1077 (stating PTSD tes-
timony has an "aura of scientific basis" that "renders it unfairly prejudicial");
Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 230 ("[To] permi[t] a person in the role of an expert
to suggest that because the complaint exhibits some of the symptoms of rape
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A few states refuse to admit PTSD testimony for any purpose. 64
For example, in Commonwealth v. Dunkle,65 the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania vacated the defendant's conviction for sexually abusing
his teenaged stepdaughter.66 The trial court had admitted expert
testimony regarding characteristic behavior of child sexual abuse
victims.67 The trial court also allowed the expert to testify to the
general reasons for child victims' delayed reporting, omission of de-
tails regarding abuse, and memory problems, without relating the
expert testimony to any specific child.6 Other witnesses testified re-
garding the victim's behavior following the alleged abuse. 69
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the admission of
such evidence was reversible error.70 The court stated that CSAAS
does not meet the Frye standard because it does not diagnose sexual
abuse as the cause of a victim's disorder.71 The court also held ex-
pert testimony regarding CSAAS inadmissible when offered to relate
typical behaviors of sexually abused children to the victim. 72 The
court stated that "[s]uch a laundry list of possible behaviors does
no more than invite [Jury] speculation and will not be condoned.
'73
Additionally, the Dunkle court found inadmissible CSAAS expert
testimony that tended to explain inconsistencies in a child's behav-
ior, including delayed reporting.74 The court found that such testi-
mony equates to an impermissible statement on the child's credibil-
ity and is unnecessary to the jury's credibility assessment of the
child victim.
75
trauma syndrome, the complainant was therefore raped, unfairly prejudices
the appellant by creating an aura of special reliability and trustworthiness.").
64. SeeJohnson v. State, 732 S.W.2d 807, 816 (Ark. 1987); Commonwealth v. Dun-
kle, 602 A.2d 830, 834 (Pa. 1992); State v. Schimpf, 782 S.W.2d 186, 193-94
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1989).
65. 602 A.2d 830 (Pa. 1992).
66. See id. at 831.





71. See id. at 833.
72. See id. at 838; see also State v. Cressey, 628 A.2d 696, 699-701 (N.H. 1993) (stat-
ing expert testimony relating child victim behaviors to symptoms of PTSD is
opining tantamount to that child was sexually abused); State v. J.Q., 599 A.2d
172 (N.J. Super. 1991).
73. Dunkle, 602 A.2d at 835.




C. Development of Maryland Law on PTSD
The Court of Appeals of Maryland first considered PTSD ex-
pert testimony in State v. Allewalt.76 The case involved a woman who
was raped by her daughter's boyfriend. 77 The defendant claimed
that the intercourse was consensual.78 The Allewalt court held that a
forensic psychiatrist's expert RTS rebuttal testimony, offered by Dr.
Michael Spodak,79 was admissible on several grounds. The court
found that the Frye standard did not apply to the PTSD evidence
because Dr. Spodak's "medical opinion [was not] presented as a sci-
entific test[,] the results of which are controlled by inexorable,
physical laws."' 80 The court stated that Dr. Spodak's rebuttal testi-
mony that the victim suffered from PTSD was relevant to the issue
of causation. 81 The court also found it significant that Dr. Spodak
based his opinion, that a rape caused the victim's PTSD, on the vic-
tim's version of events. 82 This enabled the jury to weigh both the ex-
76. 308 Md. 89, 517 A.2d 741 (1986).
77. See id. at 91, 517 A.2d at 742.
78. See id. at 91, 517 A.2d at 741.
79. Notably, unlike the expert witness in the Saldana case, the expert in Allewalt
was a medical physician. See id. at 98, 517 A.2d at 745. See generally State v. Sal-
dana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 231 (Minn. 1982) (noting expert was not a physician).
80. Allewalt, 308 Md. at 98, 517 A.2d at 745; accord People v. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d
391, 404 (Mich. 1990) (stating that the Frye standard does not apply to the be-
havioral sciences). The Allewalt majority opinion stated that Maryland law per-
mitted an examining physician "to present his medical conclusions and the in-
formation, including history and subjective symptoms, received from the
patient which provide the basis for the conclusions." Allewalt, 308 Md. at 98,
517 A.2d at 745 (citing Beahm v. Shortall, 279 Md. 321, 368 A.2d 1005 (1977)).
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Eldridge argued that the PTSD testimony
should not have been admitted because such evidence fails the Frye test when
offered for the purpose of proving that a rape occurred. See id. at 116-17, 517
A.2d at 755 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). Judge Eldridge opined that PTSD "is not
a fact-finding tool, but a therapeutic tool useful in counseling." Id. at 116, 517
A.2d at 755 (Eldridge, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227,
230 (Minn. 1982)). As such, Judge Eldridge reasoned, PTSD is not "scientifi-
cally reliable" as proof of rape and should not be admitted. Id. at 116-17, 517
A.2d at 755 (Eldridge, J., dissenting) (citing People v. Bledsoe, 681 P.2d 291,
301 (Cal. 1984)). See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text for a definition
and discussion of the Frye standard.
81. See Allewalt, 308 Md. at 98-99, 517 A.2d at 746. The Allewalt court stated that
defense counsel "opened the door" to the PTSD testimony by suggesting on
cross-examination that a stressor other than rape caused the complaining vic-
tim's disorder. See id. at 98 n.4, 517 A.2d at 746 n.4.
82. See id. at 102, 517 A.2d at 747.
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pert's and victim's credibility on the ultimate issue of consent.8 3 Fur-
thermore, the Allewalt court noted that Dr. Spodak's testimony
included other traumas as possible causes of the victim's PTSD and
omitted the term "Rape Trauma Syndrome"; thus, he avoided asso-
ciating his opinion solely with rape.s4 The court found that because
the defendant raised the veracity issue, Dr. Spodak's rebuttal testi-
mony did not impermissibly comment on the victim's credibility.
8 5
Subsequently, in Bohnert v. State,8 6 the Court of Appeals of Ma-
ryland addressed the admissibility of expert opinion testimony in a
child sexual abuse case.87 Bohnert involved a child's allegations that
her mother's boyfriend sexually abused her.88 The child recanted
her story twice prior to trial and testified "reluctantly" after first
stating she could not remember the abuse. 89 Because the State did
not present physical evidence, the credibility of the child was "cru-
cial." 9° At the end of its case in chief, the State produced a social
worker qualified as an "expert in the field of child sexual abuse." 91
The expert testified that she believed the child had been sexually
abused.92 She based this opinion on conversations with the child
and a "certain sense" she had about children; no other diagnostic
83. See id. at 103, 517 A.2d at 748. The Allewalt trial judge instructed the jury to
"give experts' testimony the weight and value you believe it should have. [The
jury is] not required to accept any expert's opinion." Id.
84. Id. at 108, 517 A.2d at 751 ("[A]voiding that terminology is more than cos-
metic.").
85. See id. at 108-09, 517 A.2d at 751. On cross-examination, Dr. Spodak stated that
the compatibility of the victim's symptoms with PTSD diagnostic criteria indi-
cated she was giving him "the straight scoop." Id. at 109, 517 A.2d at 751. In
his dissent, Judge Eldridge argued this testimony was inadmissible, reasoning
that Dr. Spodak's testimony presented a danger of unfair prejudice and jury
confusion that "far outweighed its minimal probative value." Id. at 117, 517
A.2d at 755 (Eldridge, J., dissenting); see also Vitek v. State, 295 Md. 35, 39-40,
46, 453 A.2d 514, 516, 519 (1982).
86. 312 Md. 266, 539 A.2d 657 (1988). PTSD per se was not an issue in Bohnert, as
the testifying expert had performed no diagnostic testing on the child victim.
See id. at 271-72, 539 A.2d at 660; see also infra notes 91-93 and accompanying
text.
87. See Bohnert, 312 Md. at 268, 539 A.2d at 657.
88. See id. at 269-70, 539 A.2d at 658.
89. See id. at 270, 539 A.2d at 659. The court of appeals noted that the victim may
have had reasons to falsify testimony. See id.
90. See id.
91. Id. at 270-71, 539 A.2d at 659.




The Court of Appeals of Maryland ruled the expert's opinion
inadmissible for two reasons: (1) the social worker had an insuffi-
cient factual basis for the opinion, and (2) her testimony vouched
for the credibility of the child.94 The court held that a witness's
opinion "to the effect that [another] witness is telling the truth or
lying" 95 is inadmissible as a matter of law.96 Thus, such evidence is
not subject to a trial judge's discretion, and "questions to that effect
are improper, either on direct or cross-examination." 97
In Acuna v. State,9 the Court of Appeals of Maryland reaffirmed
its position that PTSD evidence is admissible in a child sexual abuse
case where the expert's testimony is based on the victim's history
and not solely on observed behavior.99 Acuna involved a four-year-
old victim whose mother observed a neighbor sexually abusing the
child. 00 The trial judge allowed the State's expert, a clinical psychol-
ogist, to describe PTSD on direct examination and to testify that
the child displayed behavior consistent with PTSD.101 The expert
93. See id. at 271-72, 539 A.2d at 660.
94. See id. at 276-77, 539 A.2d at 662.
95. Id. at 277, 539 A.2d at 662 (citing Thompson v. Phosphate Works, 178 Md.
325, 317-19, 13 A.2d 328 (1940), and American Stores v. Herman, 166 Md. 312,
314-15, 171 A. 54 (1934)).
96. See id. at 279, 539 A.2d at 663.
97. Id. at 277-78, 539 A.2d at 662 (quoting Mutyambizi v. State, 33 Md. App. 55,
61, 363 A.2d 511, 516 (1976), and citing State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 121, 517
A.2d 741, 757 (1986)).
98. 332 Md. 65, 629 A.2d 1233 (1993).
99. See id. at 69-71, 629 A.2d at 1235-36; see also Allewalt, 308 Md. at 102, 517 A.2d
at 747.
100. See Acuna v. State, 332 Md. 65, 67, 629 A.2d 1233, 1234. The child was visiting
the neighbor, Acuna, at his apartment when the mother entered the dwelling
without knocking. See id. The mother heard the child protesting, entered the
bedroom, and observed the child lying on her back on the bed with her
nightgown pulled up and legs spread apart. See id. Acuna was kneeling in
front of the child, his hands were near her ankles, and "his face was six or
seven inches from [the child's] private area." Id. When he realized the
mother was present, Acuna began to cry. See id. At trial, Acuna denied mo-
lesting the child, stating he was merely pulling her off the bed when the
mother walked in. See id. at 68, 629 A.2d at 1234.
101. See id. The expert based her opinion on diagnostic criteria contained in the
DSM-III. See id; see supra note 7 (describing DSM-III criteria for PTSD). The
expert also testified that the child's in-court behavior was consistent with be-
havior the expert had previously observed in the child. See Acuna, 332 Md. at
69, 629 A.2d at 1235. The trial court did not allow the psychologist to testify
that the child exhibited behaviors consistent with abused children, but did al-
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was not allowed to express an opinion on causation. 10 2 However, on
cross-examination, the expert testified that the child's history, re-
lated by the parents, indicated her PTSD symptoms first appeared
during the time of the alleged sexual abuse. 103
In holding the expert's opinion admissible, the court of appeals
rejected Acuna's argument that the PTSD testimony was irrelevant
because, on direct examination, the expert failed to relate the
child's PTSD symptoms to the alleged abuse. 1°4 The court reasoned
that the child complainant's history, elicited on cross-examination,
connected her PTSD symptoms to the crime charged, thereby estab-
lishing the relevance of the evidence. 05 The Acuna decision, com-
bined with the court's holding in favor of causation expert testi-
mony in Allewalt,'°6 raised the question of whether opinion evidence
on possible causes of PTSD is admissible on direct examination in a
sexual abuse case involving neither consent'0 7 nor eyewitnesses.0 8
III. THE INSTANT CASE
In Hutton v. State,'°9 Stephen Clarence Hutton was charged with
sexually abusing his fourteen-year-old stepdaughter. 10 The child
claimed Hutton raped and otherwise sexually abused her beginning
at age seven."' She testified that she told her mother about the
abuse several times, including the day it last happened." 2 The
mother's testimony confirmed this fact. l" 3 In addition, a pediatrician
testified that a medical examination she performed when the child
low her to testify that the child's behavior was consistent with PTSD. See id.
102. See Acuna, 332 Md. at 70, 629 A.2d at 1235.
103. See id. at 70-71, 629 A.2d at 1235-36. The court noted that "a medical opinion
concerning a child may be based in part upon information received by the
professional [from the parent]." Id. at 71, 629 A.2d at 1236 (citing Yellow Cab
Co. v. Henderson, 183 Md. 546, 553, 39 A.2d 546, 550 (1944)).
104. See id. at 71-72, 629 A.2d at 1236.
105. See id. at 70-72, 629 A.2d 1235-36; see also State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 102, 517
A.2d 741, 747 (1986).
106. See Allewalt, 308 Md. at 109, 517 A.2d at 751.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 76-85.
108. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
109. 339 Md. 480, 663 A.2d 1289 (1995).
110. See id. at 484, 663 A.2d at 1291.
111. See id. at 484-85, 663 A.2d at 1291. The child "testified that ... the petitioner
would place a scarf over her eyes, put vaseline between her legs and some-
times on his penis and engage in vaginal intercourse with her." Id. at 485, 663
A.2d at 1291.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 485 n.4, 663 A.2d at 1291 n.4.
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was seven indicated the possibility of sexual abuse. 114 Hutton denied
that the events had ever occurred." 5
In the State's case in chief, the trial judge allowed two experts
to corroborate the victim's testimony." 6 The first expert, Gail Jack-
son, a clinical social worker, testified that the child displayed behav-
iors common among sexually abused children. 17 Ms. Jackson, while
not allowed to discuss PTSD, described behaviors consistent with
sexually abused children based on her observations of "at least 600"
such children she had seen in her career."8 She then testified to
consistent behaviors she observed during thirty to thirty-five sessions
with the child victim in this case." 9 On cross-examination, Ms. Jack-
son stated that stress disorders other than sexual abuse could cause
such behavioral symptoms and that the victim's credibility is impor-
tant. 120 On redirect examination, Ms. Jackson testified that she as-
sesses credibility by the consistency of clients' stories and that she
believed the child victim in this case was truthful. 121
The second expert, Dr. Nancy Davis, a clinical psychologist who
practiced with Ms. Jackson, was allowed to testify that the child vic-
tim was suffering from PTSD as a result of being sexually abused. 22
Dr. Davis, who did not perform an independent psychological evalu-
ation of the child, stated that she based her diagnosis on conversa-
tions with the child and Ms. Jackson and on the child's medical and
counseling records.
123
Hutton was convicted. In an unreported opinion, the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed.
124
A. The Majority Opinion
The court of appeals reversed the intermediate appellate court
and held that the admission of both experts' testimony regarding
the victim's credibility, as well as Dr. Davis' PTSD diagnosis, were re-
114. See id. at 485-86 n.4, 663 A.2d at 1291 n.4. The child's doctor "indicated that
the victim had no hymen and she was non-virginal." Id.
115. See id. at 490, 663 A.2d at 1293.
116. See id. at 485, 663 A.2d at 1291.
117. See id. at 485-87, 663 A.2d at 1291-92.
118. Id. at 486, 663 A.2d at 1291-92.
119. See id. at 487, 663 A.2d at 1292.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 487-88, 663 A.2d at 1292.
122. See id. at 488, 663 A.2d at 1292.
123. See id. The Hutton court did not reveal whether the lack of diagnostic psycho-
logical testing was material to its decision. See id.
124. See id. at 484, 663 A.2d at 1290.
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versible error.125 The court reasoned that when the expert cannot
objectively determine the nature of the triggering stressor, a PTSD
diagnosis is unreliable as evidence that sexual abuse occurred.
126
When the expert testifies to a particular cause of the victim's disor-
der based on the assumed accuracy of victim-supplied information,
such testimony constitutes an impermissible invasion into the jury's
function of determining the victim's credibility.
127
Hutton reaffirmed the Bohnert rule prohibiting opinion testi-
mony, including that of experts, on the credibility of another wit-
ness. 21 In holding that expert PTSD testimony is inadmissible to
prove the occurrence of sexual abuse, 129 the court distinguished its
prior decision in Allewalt3 ° by noting that the defendant in Allewalt
claimed consent. 3 ' PTSD causation expert testimony, the court clar-
ified, is admissible when the occurrence of the sexual act has been
established.1
32
The Hutton court also noted that rebuttal PTSD evidence 33 may
be admitted to help the jury assess the victim's credibility,34 includ-
125. See id. at 505, 663 A.2d at 1301. The trial judge had admitted Dr. Davis's opin-
ion, that the child's symptoms "were not in any way faked," on the basis that
psychologists may testify regarding the ultimate issue in a case. Id. at 504, 663
A.2d at 1300 (citing Maryland Psychologists Act, MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD.
PRoc. § 9-120 (1989)). The court of appeals stated, however, that credibility is
not the ultimate issue in a case. See id. (citing Yount v. State, 99 Md. App. 207,
215, 636 A.2d 50, 51 (1994)).
126. See id. at 502-03, 663 A.2d at 1300. The court noted that other causes can trig-
ger PTSD. See id. See supra note 8 for a list of triggering stressors.
127. See Hutton, 339 Md. at 503, 663 A.2d at 1300. Thus, the court adopted the po-
sition of the Saldana line of cases that PTSD causation testimony is unfairly
prejudicial in a criminal case. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
128. See Hutton, 339 Md. at 505, 663 A.2d at 1301; see also supra notes 86-97 and ac-
companying text.
129. See Hutton, 339 Md. at 504, 663 A.2d at 1301.
130. The court of special appeals had cited Allewalt in its unreported affirmance of
Hutton's conviction. See id. at 484, 663 A.2d at 1290.
131. See id. at 506, 663 A.2d at 1301.
132. See id. Notably, Allewalt involved the rape of an adult; consent is obviously not
a defense to child sexual abuse. See generally MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 463
(1987).
133. The court of appeals upheld the admission of PTSD evidence on direct exam-
ination by the State in Acuna. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
However, the Hutton court noted that the petitioner in Acuna only raised the
general relevance of PTSD evidence, not its admissibility for the purpose of
proving sexual abuse. See Hutton, 339 Md. at 501, 663 A.2d at 1299; see also
supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
134. See Hutton, 339 Md. at 504-06, 663 A.2d at 1302.
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ing explaining victim behavior that is inconsistent with the trau-
matic event, such as delayed reporting or recantation.1 35 The court
stated in dicta that admitting testimony regarding behavioral traits
that "[are] not centered on what was observed in [a particular] vic-
tim, but rather on whether the behavioral sciences recognize such
traits as being a common reaction to a unique criminal act" is con-
sistent with its prior holding in Allewalt'
36
B. The Concurring Opinions
Even though the court of appeals unanimously voted to re-
verse Hutton's conviction, the court was divided four to three re-
garding the proper use of PTSD testimony in sexual abuse cases.
37
Two concurring opinions were filed.138 In the first concurrence,
Judge Rodowsky and Chief Judge Murphy criticized the majority for
going "far beyond" the Bohnert rule by prohibiting an expert from
testifying to the triggering stressor basis of a PTSD diagnosis.
39
Judge Rodowsky and Chief Judge Murphy pointed out that Bohnert
prohibits experts from testifying that they believe the histories given
by their patients, 14° and Hutton prohibits the admission of all histo-
ries that are based only on victim statements.' 4' Such prohibition,
they noted, appears to be the first instance in Maryland evidence
law where the possibility that a patient fakes symptoms from which
an expert bases a diagnosis results in the exclusion of the expert's
opinion. 42 Under Maryland law, the possibility of patient fraud
"goes to the weight of the opinion, not its admissibility, and is prop-
135. See id. at 504, 663 A.2d at 1301; see also supra note 59 and accompanying text.
136. Hutton, 339 Md. at 507, 663 A.2d at 1302. The court stated that Allewalt is
"consistent" with courts in other jurisdictions that admit testimony relating
the victim's behavior to the "class of reported child abuse [or rape] victims"
without relating those traits to the instant complainant. Id; see supra note 60
(listing courts).
137. See Hutton, 339 Md. at 507, 519, 663 A.2d at 1302 (majority opinion).
138. Id. at 507-08, 663 A.2d at 1302 (Rodowsky, J., & Murphy, C.J., concurring); id.
at 520, 663 A.2d at 1309 (Eldridge, J., concurring).
139. See id. at 511, 663 A.2d at 1304 (Rodowsky, J., & Murphy, C.J., concurring).
Unlike Bohnert, the experts in Hutton had a substantial factual basis for their
opinions, and physical evidence was presented that the jury could have found
compelling. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
140. See Hutton, 339 Md. at 511, 663 A.2d at 1304 (Rodowsky, J., & Murphy, C.J.,
concurring).
141. See id. at 508, 663 A.2d at 1302 (Rodowsky, J., & Murphy, C.J., concurring).
142. See id. at 509, 663 A.2d at 1303 (Rodowsky, J., & Murphy, C.J., concurring).
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erly the subject of cross-examination of the expert."143
Judge Rodowsky and Chief Judge Murphy also argued that
PTSD evidence is particularly relevant in child sexual abuse cases
because the State often lacks physical and eyewitness evidence.
144
Relevance is based on the increased probability that sexual abuse
occurred if the child complainant has PTSD. 45 A PTSD diagnosis is
not unfairly prejudicial provided the expert informs the jury that
the basis for the diagnosis is partly patient-supplied information.
46
Additionally, Judge Rodowsky and Chief Judge Murphy stated
that "[a] diagnosis of PTSD resulting, per history, from [child sex-
ual abuse] is not a scientific test for determining [child sexual
abuse] .'47 As such, they rejected the application of the Frye stan-
dard by analogizing Hutton to Allewalt.
14
1
In the second concurring opinion, Judge Eldridge reaffirmed
his belief that the Frye standard applies to a PTSD diagnosis and
that such evidence fails this threshold test of admissibility. 49 The
majority opinion, however, stated only that Frye is inapplicable
"when the occurrence of the precipitating traumatic event has been
conceded, has not been challenged, or has been established." 50
IV. ANALYSIS
The disagreement within the court of appeals in Hutton regard-
ing the proper use of PTSD evidence in sexual abuse cases reflects
a similar division among jurisdictions across the country. 5' Legal
scholars also differ on a PTSD expert's appropriate role in the
courtroom. 5 2 For example, some commentators agree with Judge
Rodowsky and Chief Judge Murphy's position that the Frye test
should not be applied to PTSD testimony in order to make such ev-
idence more easily admitted. 53 Other scholars argue that use of
143. Id.
144. See id. at 508, 663 A.2d at 1302-03 (Rodowsky, J., & Murphy, C.J., concurring).
145. See id. at 514, 663 A.2d at 1305 (Rodowsky, J., & Murphy, C.J., concurring).
146. See id. at 514, 663 A.2d at 1305-06 (Rodowsky, J., & Murphy, C.J., concurring).
147. Id. at 514, 663 A.2d at 1306 (Rodowsky, J., & Murphy, C.J., concurring).
148. See id; see also supra note 80 and accompanying text.
149. See Hutton, 339 Md. at 520, 663 A.2d at 1309 (Eldridge, J., concurring) (con-
curring "in the result only," and citing State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 111-25,
517 A.2d 741, 752-59 (1986) (Eldridge, J., dissenting)); see also supra note 80.
150. Hutton, 339 Md. at 495-96, 663 A.2d at 1296.
151. See supra notes 35-74 and accompanying text.
152. See infra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
153. See Feagan, supra note 9, at 153 (stating PTSD evidence is "soft," rather than
"hard," scientific evidence, which is "quantifiabl[y] based on nonhuman, ob-
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PTSD evidence should be eliminated from, or restricted in, child
sexual abuse cases because of its unreliable nature.'54
A. The Hutton Court Failed to Recognize the Special Evidentiary
Problems of Child Sexual Abuse
While the Hutton court prudently rejected the experts' testi-
mony that directly vouched for the credibility of the victim,155 the
court's failure to distinguish between adult and child sexual abuse
cases is troubling. 156 The court's reasoning that lay jurors are capa-
ble of evaluating witness credibility in a child sex abuse case as-
sumes that the jurors' understanding of child behavior is compara-
ble to their knowledge of adult behavior.S57 In a child sexual abuse
case, however, particularly where the defendant is a family member,
most jurors lack the specialized knowledge needed to evaluate com-
jective testing devices" (quoting Charles Bleil, Evidence of Syndromes: No Need for
a "Better Mousetrap," 32 S. TEx. L. REv. 37, 40 (1990)).
154. See Askowitz, supra note 2, at 208 (citing Josephine A. Bulkley, The Prosecution's
Use of Social Science Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: National Trends
and Recommendations, I J. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 73 (1992)); see also Gary B. Mel-
ton & Susan Limber, Psychologists' Involvement in Cases of Child Maltreatment:
Limits of Role and Expertise, 44 Am. PSYCH. 1225 (1989). One reason commenta-
tors are concerned by the increasing use of mental health experts in the
courtroom is that such experts may confuse their clinical and forensic tasks:
Many clinicians have no business in the courtroom. Their training in
clinical methods of inquiry and treatment encourages them to err in
the direction of diagnosing illness, invites many of them to speculate
wildly about unconscious determinants of behavior, and frequently
discourages systematic theoretical inquiry. Many clinicians are not
sensitive to the limitations of their own disciplines; if they are not re-
searchers, they focus on what they think they know rather than on
what they do not know. More important, many clinicians are entirely
untrained in, and insensitive to, the purposes and limitations of the
legal process.
Richard J. Bonnie & Christopher Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Profession-
als in the Criminal Process: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REv. 427,
457 (1980). One study of 122 appellate' decisions in child sexual abuse cases
revealed that none of the decisions were reversed on the grounds of expert
qualification to express an opinion, even when such grounds were raised. See
Mary Ann Mason, The Child Sex Abuse Syndrome: The Other Major Issue in State
of New Jersey v. Margaret Kelly Michaels, I PSYCHOL PUB. POL'Y & L. 399, 399
(1995).
155. See Hutton, 339 Md. at 504-05, 663 A.2d at 1301.
156. See id. at 508, 663 A.2d at 1302 (Rodowsky, J., & Murphy, C.J., concurring).
157. See generally Hutton, 339 Md. at 503, 663 A.2d at 1300 ("[T]he veracity of a wit-
ness is not beyond the understanding of a juror." (citation omitted)).
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plex issues involved in assessing victim credibility.
1 58
PTSD testimony is particularly relevant in child sexual abuse
cases because, by nature, such cases are difficult to prove.'5 9 For ex-
ample, a lack of corroborating eyewitness or physical evidence is
typical in a child sexual abuse situation. 6° These problems are com-
pounded because children, especially abused children, are often
poor witnesses.16' The Hutton decision, particularly its unequivocal
rejection of all aspects of the expert testimony involved, 162 may com-
promise a child's right to be free from abuse because the holding
will likely decrease the number of prbsecutions or convictions of
child sexual abusers.
B. The Hutton Decision Is Inconsistent With Existing Maryland Law
The Hutton opinion departed from previous decisions rendered
by the court of appeals in several ways.' 63 First, in Allewalt, the court
of appeals did not broadly reject PTSD testimony on the basis of
the expert's vouching for a witness's credibility, even though there
was a basis for such a result 64 Rather, the consent defense and the
fact that the expert opinion regarding victim credibility was given
on rebuttal rendered the testimony admissible.165 Although the cases
were decided differently, the same dangers of usurping the jury's
role in judging credibility and excessive jury reliance on expert tes-
timony that were decisive in Hutton were also present in Allewalt.
Second, the Allewalt court stated that, under Maryland law, a
treating physician may testify to a patient's subjective history as a ba-
sis for the diagnosis at issue in the trial. 166 Subsequently, the Hutton
court inconsistently stated that subjective patient history evidence is
158. See, e.g., State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 609-10 (Minn. 1984); see also supra
notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
159. See Hutton, 339 Md. at 508, 663 A.2d at 1302-03 (Rodowsky, J., & Murphy, C.J.,
concurring).
160. See id. (Rodowsky, J., & Murphy, C.J., concurring).
161. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
162. See Hutton, 339 Md. at 505, 663 A.2d at 1301. The experts had described char-
acteristics of PTSD to the jury and related those behaviors to the victim. See id.
Thus, Hutton could be interpreted as prohibiting the admission of any PTSD
testimony on direct examination.
163. See supra notes 75-84, 98-105 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
165. See Hutton, 339 Md. at 520, 663 A.2d at 1308 (Rodowsky, J., & Murphy, C.J.,
concurring).
166. See State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 98, 517 A.2d 741, 745 (1986) (citing Beahm v.
,) Shortall, 279 Md. 321, 368 A.2d 1005 (1977)); see also MD. RULE 5-703.
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an inadmissible basis for a psychological opinion. 167
Third, the Hutton court based its holding on the unreliability of
the personal history a victim furnishes to the testifying expert.
68
This contradicts the court's endorsement of a child victim's history
as a basis for admissible PTSD evidence in Acuna. 69
Finally, the Hutton ruling is inconsistent with the Maryland Rules
of Evidence, which were promulgated by the court of appeals. Specifi-
cally, the rules provide: (1) statements made by a patient to a
health care provider that are pertinent to a medical diagnosis are
admissible as substantive evidence; 70 and (2) an admissible expert
opinion may be based on inadmissible facts, as long as such facts
are "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular
field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject .... 171
These rules demonstrate the court of appeals's confidence in a
167. See Allewalt, 308 Md. at 99, 517 A.2d at 746 ("Maryland evidence law recog-
nizes such medical opinions to be competent on, and relevant to, the issue of
causation in addition to the fact of bodily harm."); supra notes 123, 127 and
accompanying text; see also infra notes 174-76.
168. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. Neither the Acuna nor the Hutton
courts commented on the fact that the Acuna expert related the child victim's
PTSD symptoms to sexual abuse on cross-examination rather than on direct
examination. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. Also, it remains un-
clear whether the type of cross-examination and rebuttal expert testimony ad-
mitted in Allewalt is still admissible after the Bohnert court's holding that credi-
bility testimony is totally inadmissible. See supra note 97 and accompanying
text.
170. See Hutton, 339 Md. at 510, 663 A.2d at 1304 (Rodowsky, J., & Murphy, C.J.,
concurring) (citing MD. RuLE 5-803(b) (4)). The rule, one of the hearsay ex-
ceptions, allows admission into evidence of the following:
Statements made for purposes of medical treatment or medical diag-
nosis in contemplation of treatment and describing medical history,
or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensation, or the inception or
general character of the cause or external sources thereof insofar as
reasonably pertinent to treatment or diagnosis in contemplation of
treatment.
MD. RuLE 5-803(b) (4). In their concurrence, Judge Rodowsky and Chief Judge
Murphy argued that the majority erred in "exclud[ing] a PTSD diagnosis
from evidence because the expert has accepted the history in forming the di-
agnosis" when the law allows mental health care providers to testify to facts in
a patient's history. Hutton, 330 Md. at 511, 663 A.2d at 1304 (Rodowsky, J., &
Murphy, C.J., concurring). The possibility that the history contains false state-
ments properly "goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility." Id.
at 509, 663 A.2d at 1303 (Rodowsky, J., & Murphy, C.J., concurring).
171. MD. RULE 5-703(a). I
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jury's ability to consider relevant expert opinion testimony in its
proper context. In their concurrence, Judge Rodowsky and Chief
Judge Murphy aptly noted that the Hutton majority opinion is
"highly anomalous."
17 2
The Hutton court's broad rejection of the expert PTSD testi-
mony at issue presents a danger that future juries will not be al-
lowed to hear or will not understand relevant and important psychi-
atric evidence. 7 3 Both the opportunity to cross-examine the expert
and the use of appropriate jury instructions alleviate the danger
that PTSD causation testimony would result in unfair prejudice.
174
Specifically, the jury would be instructed to disregard such testi-
mony on finding "that any essential predicate of the PTSD opinion
did not occur .... ,,171 This would assure that the jury understands
the opinion is based on the victim's subjective statements.
7 6
C. Proper PTSD Expert Testimony After Hutton
While the Hutton case reaffirmed the evidentiary rule that an
expert witness may not vouch for another witness's credibility, the
court of appeals failed to provide clear guidelines regarding the ad-
missibility of psychiatric testimony in sexual abuse cases. 177 In a post-
Hutton child sexual abuse case, Hall v. State,18 the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland upheld 79 the admission of "conduct disorder"
expert testimony80 in the prosecutor's case in chief'8' where the
172. Hutton, 339 Md. at 510, 663 A.2d at 1303 (Rodowsky, J., & Murphy, C.J., con-
curring).
173. See supra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
174. See MARYLAND CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION § 3:14 (1995) (" [A jury]
should give expert testimony the weight and value [the jury] believe[s] it
should have. [The jury is] not required to accept any expert's opinion. [The
jury] should consider an expert's opinion together with all the other evi-
dence.")
175. Hutton, 339 Md. at 513, 663 A.2d at 1305 (Rodowsky, J., & Murphy, C.J., con-
curring). The trial judge in Allewalt instructed the jury that it "should give ex-
perts' testimony the weight and value you believe it should have. You are not
required to accept any expert's opinion." State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 103,
517 A.2d 741, 748 (1986); see also supra notes 23, 174.
176. See Hutton, 339 Md. at 509, 663 A.2d at 1303 (Rodowsky, J., & Murphy, C.J.,
concurring).
177. See supra notes 163-72 and accompanying text.
178. 107 Md. App. 684, 670 A.2d 962, cert. denied, 342 Md. 473, 677 A.2d 565
(1996).
179. See id. at 695, 670 A.2d at 968.
180. See id. at 688, 670 A.2d at 964. The expert, a clinical social worker, stated that
she "diagnosed" the child as suffering from "major depression" and "conduct
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defendant denied abusing the child. 182 The court ruled that the ex-
pert's opinion that the child's disorders were consistent with sexual
abuse "was entirely proper."18 3 The court stated that Hutton does not
preclude the admission of such testimony that assumes the veracity
of the victim patient's history.1' 4
Therefore, while Hutton clearly favors defendants, expert opin-
ion testimony offered by prosecutors in sexual abuse cases may be
more readily admitted if the expert avoids the use of the labels
"APTSD" or "ACSAAS," as occurred in HalL85 Expert opinion testi-
mony that the child displayed behavior consistent with sexual abuse
avoids Frye analysis problems and may avoid the jury placing undue
importance on the scientific connotation of PTSD or CSAAS.'
8 6
Other possible causes of the child's behavior can be brought out on
cross-examination. The judge should also ensure that the jury un-
derstands that the expert opinion is based on subjective, historical
information. 187 Finally, the proponent of the PTSD evidence must
make clear the purpose for which the evidence is being offered. 188
V. CONCLUSION
In holding that expert opinion testimony regarding child PTSD
is inadmissible when offered to prove that the child was sexually
disorder" under the DSM-III. See id. See generally supra note 7 (describing DSM-
III criteria for PTSD). She stated that the child displayed behavioral problems
that included lying, stealing, and "acting out sexually." Id. at 687-88, 670 A.2d
at 964. The expert did not use the terms "APTSD" or "ACSAAS" in her testi-
mony.
181. See id. at 687, 670 A.2d at 963.
182. See id.
183. Id. at 695, 670 A.2d at 967. The expert stated that her opinion was based on
information received by the victim patient. See id. at 689, 670 A.2d at 964. The
expert stated on cross-examination that the child had exhibited behavior of ly-
ing from the time he began seeing her up until the time of trial. See id. at
690, 670 A.2d at 965.
184. See id. at 693, 670 A.2d at 966 (citing Acuna v. State, 332 Md. 65, 629 A.2d
1233 (1993), and MD. RULE 5-703).
185. See supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
186. Cf Hutton v. State, 339 Md. 480, 503, 663 A.2d 1289, 1299 (1995) ("[A]llowing
the expert to identify the traumatic event precipitating the PTSD runs a great
risk [that] the jury will give the expert opinion too great weight and not real-
ize it is solely dependent on the veracity of the patient." (citing State v. Taylor,
663 S.W.2d 235, 240 (1984))).
187. See Hall, 107 Md. App at 693 n.5, 670 A.2d at 966 n.5.
188. See Hutton, 339 Md. at 506, 663 A.2d at 1302; see also Hal 107 Md. App. at 691-
92, 670 A.2d at 965-66.
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abused, Maryland joins several other states that view the probative
value of this evidence as being substantially outweighed by its unfair
prejudice.' 89 The Hutton court was divided on almost all aspects of
PTSD evidence admission, including whether the Frye standard is
applicable, whether PTSD meets the Frye standard, whether such ev-
idence is reliable, and whether the danger of unfair prejudice out-
weighs its probative value. 190 The Hutton opinion must be read in
conjunction with prior and subsequent Maryland cases in order for
a practitioner to fully understand Maryland's limitations on the use
of PTSD expert testimony. 91
The admission in Hall of PTSD-type testimony, based on the
child complainant's history, indicates that the court of special ap-
peals has read Hutton rather narrowly. Nevertheless, it remains un-
clear to what extent this type of testimony will be allowed in a pros-
ecutor's case in chief. In dicta, the Hutton court approved such use
on rebuttal.19 2 The courts should admit expert PTSD or CSAAS evi-
dence, including causation evidence, on direct examination in child
sexual abuse cases with an opportunity for cross-examination and
proper jury instruction. The legal system has a heightened duty to
protect children from sexual abuse because they are incapable of
protecting themselves.
Lynn M. Marshall
189. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 137-50 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 76-85, 98-105, 178-84 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
1997]
